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L INTRODUCTION
THIS ESSAY FOCUSES on how public debt and assets should be
apportioned during state secession to achieve a quick, fair, and equitable
result for both the seceding state and the parent state. This Essay analyzes
the different approaches to the division of debt and assets and concludes
that among the various approaches, the per capita basis approach is the
most efficient and equitable. Specifically examined is how debt and asset
apportionment should be applied if Quebec secedes from Canada. The
feasibility of the different approaches of debt apportionment is studied
using Canada's public debt as a model, while the various assets present
in Canada are utilized to analyze the apportionment of assets.
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eventually led to his elevation to membership on the Central Committee. During the
World War II, he carried out a diplomatic mission to Mexico, an opportunity which
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the defense of Pierre Laval, the Prime Minister of Vichy France. He died in Paris in
1959. The Musie des Sciences de l'Homme (Paris) named its library the Biblioth~que
Femand Corcos in his honor.
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memory, this award for the best student paper in the area of international and
comparative law was established by his nephews and great-niece.
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This Essay utilizes the Quebec/Canada situation as a springboard for
the development of theories concerning the principles of international law
that govern the apportionment of public debt and assets under state
secession. Presently, there is no customary law concerning the apportion-
ment of debt during state secession, and the acknowledged manner of
asset apportionment during state secession is not an established, uniform
practice under international law.' Although international practice has
developed some general principles which are codified in the 1983 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Ar-
chives and Debts,2 the 1983 Vienna Convention was never ratified, and
thus its rules are not binding.3
See Daniel Desjardins & Claude Gendron, Legal Issues Concerning the Division
of Assets and Debt in State Succession: The Canada-Quebec Debate, in CLOSING THE
BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS UP 1, 5, 11, 26
(John McCallum ed., 1991); NEIL FINKELSTEIN & GEORGE VEGH, THE SEPARATION OF
QUEBEC AND THE CONSTITUTION OF CANADA 3 (Background Studies of the York
University Constitutional Reform Project Study No. 2, 1992); Gregory Marchildon &
Edward Maxwell, Quebec's Right of Secession Under Canadian and International Law,
32 VA. J. INT'L L. 583, 620 (1992).
2 See SHARON A. WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL EFFECTS OF SECESSION BY
QUEBEC 43-44 (Background Studies of the York University Constitutional Reform
Project Study No. 3, 1992); Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 26.
' See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 44; ROBERT A. YOUNG, THE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC AND THE FUTURE OF CANADA 110 (1995) [hereinafter YOUNG, SECESSION OF
QUEBEC].
The word "secession" has replaced the word "succession" when referring to a
formal withdrawal from a federation. See generally YOUNG, supra; Marchildon &
Maxwell, supra note 1; ALLEN BUCHANAN, SECESSION (1991); Desjardins & Gendron,
supra note 1. Cf. United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of
State Property, Archives and Debts: Vienna, Mar. 1 - Apr. 8, 1993: 1 Official Records:
Summary Records of the Plenary Meeting and of the Committee of the Whole, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf.117/16 (1995); OKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES (1972); DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN
MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1967). "State secession" is defined as the
"withdrawal from an existing state." BUCHANAN, supra, at 22. The dictionary definition
of the word "secession" is "the act or process of one person taking the place of
another in the enjoyment of or liability for his rights or duties or both." WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra, at 1178. The word "secession" describes
taking control of territory by preventing the existing state from continuing to exerts its
state power in that territory, while the word "succession" describes when one state
ceases to exist in a given territory and its place is taken by another state. See
BUCHANAN, supra, at 10-11; UDOKANG, supra, at 106. The similarity between the use
of the words "secession" and "succession" while discussing states explains the past,
interchangeable use of the words. The current use of "secession" rather than "succes-
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Because international law is deficient in governing the apportionment
of public debt and assets during state secession,4 this Essay examines the
apportionment of public debt and assets in three previous sessions:
Belgium's secession from the Netherlands in 1830,' Norway's secession
from Sweden in 1905,6 and Slovakia's secession from the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic in 1993.! These three secessions most closely
resemble Quebec's attempt to secede from Canada, though they do not
provide directly comparable precedent! An examination of the apportion-
ment approach for debt and assets utilized in these successful, peaceful
secessions aids in the determination of which apportionment approach
should be employed if Quebec secedes from Canada, and for peaceful
secessions in general.'
A. The Need for Standardization in the Apportionment of Public Debt
and Assets During State Secessions
Since the apportionment of public debt and assets is considered one
of the toughest and longest negotiation subjects during state secessions,"°
sion" may have resulted from the realization that the present dictionary definition of
"secession" more closely defines the formal withdrawal from a federation than the
present dictionary definition of "succession." This Essay uses "secession" to include all
succession principles.
" See generally Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that internation-
al law theories and proposals in this area are diverse and often contradictory).
5 See JONATHAN E. HELMREICH, BELGIUM AND EUROPE: A STUDY IN SMALL
POWER DIPLOMACY 16 (1976).
6 See LEE C. BUCHHErr, SECESSION: THE LEGrIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 98
(1978); ALAN FREEMAN & PATRICK GRADY, DIVIDING THE HOUSE: PLANNING FOR A
CANADA WITHOUT QUEBEC 62-68 (1994); Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 1, at 622
n.186.
7 See ROBERT A. YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1 (1994) [hereinafter
YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA]; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
42; MILICA ZARTROVIC BOOKMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF SECESSION 33 (1992).
' See generally Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 26 (describing Quebec's
attempted secession as being a unique and unprecedented situation).
' See generally Robert A. Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, 27 CAN.
J. OF POL. Sci. 773, 774 (1994) (providing reasons that the study of peaceful seces-
sions may be valuable in present cases) [hereinafter Young, How Do Peaceful Se-
cessions Happen?].
"0 See Paul Boothe et al., Dismantling Confederation: The Divisive Question of the
National Debt, in CLOSING THE BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF
CANADA BREAKS UP, supra note 1, at 27, 28; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1,
at 17; Yvan Stringer, Sharing Modest Thoughts on How to Share an Immodest Debt,
in CLOSING THE BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
it would be beneficial for a set of rules or guidelines for the apportion-
ment of public debt and assets to be developed to achieve an easy and
efficient settlement for all peaceful secessions." Currently in state se-
cessions, both the seceding state and the parent state present different
methods for apportioning public debt and assets. 12 This approach produc-
es a prolonged and costly debate concerning how to divide the debt and
assets because each party proposes the method of apportionment most
beneficial to its particular interests. 3
Extended bargaining over the apportionment of the public debt and
assets could prove costly 4 because cool-headed calculations may not be
easily made during heated secession negotiations. 5 A heated debate
between the seceding state and the parent state over the apportionment of
the public debt and assets could affect both states' international credibility
rating. 6 Additional activities hurt by a prolonged debate include future
trade between the two states and the states' participation in financial mar-
kets.17 A quick agreement between the seceding state and the parent state
on the apportionment of debt and assets is imperative to a smooth,
peaceful, and inexpensive transition to independence. Furthermore, the
Up, supra note 1, at 56, 56; MARCEL C6TA & DAVID JOHNSTON, IF QUABEc GOES
... THE REAL COST OF SEPARATION 98-99 (1995); YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 46-48. Cf. YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra
note 3, at 202, 219 (stating that this will be a difficult issue if Quebec secedes from
Canada).
11 Cf. BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing that numerous economic decisions
need to be made and new legal institutions need to be created to support these
decisions); Summary of Discussion, in 2 ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE 510, 511 (Robin W. Broadway et al. eds., 1991).
12 See John F. Chant, Dividing the Debt: Avoiding the Burden, in CLOSING THE
BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS Up, supra note 1,
84, 89; COT & JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 100.
"3 See Chant, supra note 12, at 89; BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 119-20. Desjardins
& Gendron, supra note 1, at 17.
14 See generally Chant, supra note 12, at 87-90.
," See Irene K. Ip & William B.P. Robinson, Liquidating the Federal Balance
Sheet: Some Additional Modest Proposals, in CLOSING THE BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL
ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS Up, supra note 1, at 69, 69-70; John
McCallum, Introduction to CLOSING THE BOOKS: DIVIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT
IF CANADA BREAKS UP, supra note 1, at vii, vii.
'6 See Chant, supra note 12, at 87-88.
'7 See id.; C6TP & JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 188; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra
note 6, at 147.
's See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 100. Cf. Paul Boothe &
Richard Harris, Alternative Divisions of Federal Assets and Liabilities, in 2 ECONOMIC
DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUrTONAL CHANGE, supra note 11, at 453, 468.
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international capital markets require a quick agreement on the apportion-
ment of debt. Otherwise, the seceding state's economic system would be
strained by an increase of seceding transaction costs resulting from the
seceding state's uncertain economic situation. 9 Specifically, the interest
rates would rise quickly to prevent capital flight, investments would de-
cline, and the stock market would falter.2
To avoid costs caused by both states arguing over an acceptable
method for the apportionment of public debt and assets, an outside party
should develop an equitable standard for public debt and asset apportion-
ment. Currently, there are four different approaches to apportion public
debt and assets: the per capita approach, the gross domestic product ap-
proach, the historical benefits approach, and the historical tax shares
approach.2' Each approach is based on a different rationale, and prefer-
ence for one approach over another depends on the values or objectives
of the individual parties. The four approaches are based on different
ideologies and can lead to a wide variety of apportionment results. Thus,
creating a new approach for public debt and asset apportionment is
unnecessary. Determining the most acceptable apportionment approach is
favored over creating a new approach.'
Most past secessions are inadequate for developing a set of rules or
guidelines for the peaceful apportionment of debt and assets because they
usually resulted from conquests, armed conflicts, conveyances, or decolo-
nizations.2 Examples include Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan in
1971,' Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia in 1992,' and Eritrea's
'9 Cf YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 100; Pierre Fortin, The
Threat of Quebec Sovereignty: Meaning, Likelihood and Economic Consequences, in 2
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 11, at 335, 343.
20 Cf. YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 100; Fortin, supra note 19,
at 338.
21 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; Boothe et al., supra
note 10, at 28; McCallum, supra note 15, at viii; James E. Pesando, Comment, in 2
ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, supra note 11, at 489, 489;
Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 454.
2 See Stringer, supra note 10, at 56.
3 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 6; Young, How Do Peaceful Seces-
sions Happen?, supra note 9, at 776 (stating that "contested secessions are far more
numerous than peaceful ones").
24 See Harun-or-Rashid, Bangladesh: The First Successful Secessionist Movement in
the Third World, in SECESSIONIST MOVEMENTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECrIVE 83,
(Ralph R. Premdas et al. eds., 1990); FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 60;
Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr., Note, Secession: State Practice and International Law After
the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 3 " DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
299, 310-13 (1993); see also BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 34 (explaining that the
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secession from Ethiopia in 1993.' In these secessions, military force
determined the apportionment of public debt and assets between the
seceding state and the parent state.27 The deluge of secessions in the
1990s requires the creation of a standardized approach for the apportion-
ment of public debt and assets.' Hopefully, the same approach devel-
oped for the apportionment of public debt and assets during peaceful
secessions could be utilized to resolve apportionment issues in violent se-
cessions.
B. Reasons for Applying Debt and Asset Apportionment Concepts to the
Quebec/Canada Scenario
An analysis of Quebec's possible secession from Canada is particu-
larly appropriate for determining the best approach for the apportionment
of public debt and assets during peaceful secessions because results can
be achieved without having to take into account the effect of military
conflict.29 There is a consensus that if Quebec elects to secede, Canada
would not use military force to block Quebec's secession.'
The desire of many Quebecers to secede from Canada has been
building for decades and will not disappear after this single vote against
secession in 1996."' With a record amount of over 92% of Quebec's
eligible voters participating in the last referendum, 50.6% voted against
Bangladesh succession movement involved a violent transition with international
intervention).
' See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 33; see generally Eastwood, supra note 24, at
322-28.
26 See generally Angela M. Lloyd, Note, The Southern Sudan: A Compelling Case
for Secession, 32 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 419, 435-38 (1994) (describing Eritrea's
secession from Ethiopia). For a more in-depth treatment of Eritrea's secession, see
Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: The Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
479 (1994).
27 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 119 (noting that war and violence impact the
distribution of debt).
2 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 118; Marchildon & Maxwell, supra note 1, at
620-22; see also BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 26-34 (including Slovakia, Eritrea, and all
the countries emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia).
2 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 28, 206-07; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF
QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 4-5.
o See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 206-07; Marchildon & Maxwell, supra
note 1, at 621-22; PHiup RESNICK, TOWARD A CANADA-QUEBEC UNION 57-58 (1991);
YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 4-5; BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 32.
3 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 1; Clyde H. Farnsworth, Quebec, by
Razor-Thin Margin, Votes "No" on Leaving Canada, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1995, at
Al; Fortin, supra note 19, at 336.
APPORTIONING PUBLIC DEBT AND ASSETS
secession while 49.4% voted for secession.32 The side voting against
secession won by roughly 52,000 votes.33 This small margin of defeat
has encouraged secessionists to believe that Quebec will secede from
Canada in the near future.34 The main goal of Quebec's Premier, Jacques
Parizeau, and his political Party, Parti Quebecois, which controls Quebec's
National Assembly, is to have Quebec secede from Canada and become
an independent country. In addition, there is a "near consensus among
knowledgeable American diplomats that Quebec . .. eventually [will
secede from Canada]."'36 Consequently, it is likely that the establishment
of a standard approach for the apportionment of the public debt and as-
sets, in the event of a state secession by Quebec, will have to be deter-
mined sometime in Canada's future to make the transition as smooth as
possible.
II. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DEBT AND ASSET
APPORTIONMENT
Sources of international law on state secession are found in treaties,
doctrines, and precedents3 Nonetheless, international law does not have
any set rules concerning the apportionment of debt and assets during state
secessions," and international case law does not provide firm guidance
on the peaceful apportionment of debt and assets during state seces-
sions.39 Instead, there are contradictory theories on how to apportion the
public debt and assets between the seceding state and the parent state.'
32 See Farnsworth, supra note 31.
3' See Donald McKenzie, Voting-Fraud Charges Spark Inquiry: No-Side Backers
Claim They Were Told to Reject Ballots if the Xs Were Too Dark or Too Light,
WINDSOR STAR, November 8, 1995, at A12; Christopher S. Wren, Quebec Party
Unlikely to Seek a New Sovereignty Vote Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1995, at §1, 9;
Farnsworth, supra note 31.
See Farnsworth, supra note 31.
3s See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 11; COTE & JOHNSTON, supra note 10,
at 214; Farnsworth, supra note 31.
36 LANSING LAMONT, BREAKUP. THE COMING END OF CANADA AND THE STAKES
FOR AMERICA 244 (1994); see also YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at
120.
' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 2; see also discussion supra part V
(discussing precedents established by the state secessions of Belgium, Norway, and
Slovakia).
31 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 109.
3'9 See id. at 110.
€' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 26.
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A. Debt
Although there is no agreement in international law on how to
apportion the public debt during state secession, it is generally accepted
that the seceding state should pay its fair share of the debt.4' However,
it is also accepted that unless the seceding state voluntarily assumes its
fair share of the debt, the creditors of the parent state do not have any
claim against the seceding state to force repayment of the debt.42 There
are no preemptory rules or uniform customs in international law that
require the seceding state to be responsible for the public debt of the
parent state.43
The principle of privity of contract holds that contracts are only
enforceable between the contracting parties.' For example, since Canada
is the party that entered into contracts with its creditors, Canada bears full
legal responsibility for servicing those debts.45 "[I]ntemational law would
not transfer automatically to an independent Quebec any obligation toward
Canada's creditors" because Quebec would not be directly liable to the
creditors of Canada's public debt.' If Quebec chooses to assume a por-
tion of Canada's public debt, then Canada's creditors would have a right
to collect from Quebec.47 The practice of preventing the parent state
from forcing its debt obligations onto the seceding state was originally
adopted in situations where the seceding state was a former colony of the
parent state."
Although there is no uniformly accepted rule of international law
which obligates the seceding state to pay a portion of the public debt,
there is a tendency within current international law to require the seceding
state to assume an equitable share of the public debt.49 When Singapore
seceded from Malaysia in 1965 and Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan in
41 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 112; WRLLAMS, supra note 2, at 47;
FINKELSTEIN & VEGH, supra note 1, at 3-4.
' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 112; FINELSTEIN & VEGa, supra note
1, at 64.
' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1 at 6; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 45-46;
YOUNG, SECESION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 110 (1995).
4 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 10.
' See WLIJAMS; supra note 2, at 46-47; Chant, supra note 12, at 88; YOUNG,
SECE SION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 110.
4 See McCallum, supra note 15, at vii.
See generally Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 9 (asserting that while
there are no international rules or customs on point, it is the opinion of the authors
that Quebec must first voluntarily assume the debt).
4' See id. at 19.
4 See id. at 19-21; McCallum, supra note 15, at vii-viii.
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1971, both seceding states agreed to accept a portion of the public
debt.50 This tendency is based on the theory that since the seceding state
inherits assets financed by the public debt, it is wrong for the seceding
state to be exempt from having to assume an equitable share of the
public debt." Economic and political realities usually compel the seced-
ing state to voluntarily assume its share of the public debt52 For in-
stance, when Ukraine seceded from the former Soviet Union, Ukraine
initially refused to pay any part of the Soviet Union's outstanding debt. 3
However, for four months no other country would loan money to Ukraine
until it finally agreed to pay its share of the Soviet debt. 4 As a result,
a seceding state may desire to voluntarily assume a portion of the public
debt to portray itself as a respectable borrower in international financial
markets 5
Although international legal convention currently favors the seceding
state having to assume an equitable share of the public debt, there is, no
consensus on how to determine this equitable share.56 Presently, deter-
mining how to calculate an equitable share of the public debt is subject
to considerable haggling which can harm both the seceding state and the
parent state.? Consequently, there is a need to establish an optimal
approach for apportioning the public debt during state secession.
B. Assets
The seceding state's right to possess all fixed assets located within
its territorial borders is widely acknowledged, though it is not an estab-
lished uniform criterion.58 All financial assets related to the seceding
state's territory or to the exercise of the state's sovereignty are also under
the state's legal authority. 9 There are no rules of international law
pertaining to the apportionment of fixed assets which are located outside
the seceding state and the parent state's territory, such as embassies and
See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 112.
5, See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 20-21.
S2 See id. at 10; McCallum, supra note 15, at vii-viii.
5 See C6Tt & JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 189; BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 121.
54 See C6T1 & JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 189; BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 121.
See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 20.
56 See id. at 24. Cf FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 53.
See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 53; Chant, supra note 12, at 89.
5 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 11; WlIIAMS, supra note 2, at 44;
YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 110; FINKELSThIN & VEGH, supra
note 1, at 58-59.
" See FINKELMSE & VEGH, supra note 1, at 58; YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC,
supra note 3, at 110; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 13.
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consulates, except that these assets should be divided in an equitable
manner.' Following these principles, if Quebec secedes from Canada,
Quebec would take ownership of Canada's fixed assets situated in Quebec
and Canada's financial assets located or linked to Quebec's sovereignty
without compensating Canada.6' Canada would possess all fixed assets
which remain within its borders and all financial assets which are under
its control or not directly linked to Quebec. 2
I1. 1983 VIENNA CONVENiON ON SuccEssIoN OF STATE IN RESPECT
OF STATE PROPERTY, ARcHIvEs AND DEBTS
The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State
Property, Archives and Debts was created to codify the many general
principles developed for the apportionment of public debt and assets
during state secession.' 3 Although the Vienna Convention is not an
authoritative source on the law of state secession, 6' it represents the
current trend in international law for the apportionment of public debt and
assets during state secession.'
A. Debt
The Vienna Convention imposes an obligation on the seceding state
to assume an equitable portion of the parent state's debt in the absence
of any agreement between the two states concerning the apportionment of
debt.' The Vienna Convention does not provide guidance on how to
determine this equitable proportion.67 The Vienna Convention also fails
to address whether a creditor attempting to recover money owed to it for
' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 12, 20-21; FREEMAN & GRADY,
supra note 6, at 111.
61 See McCallum, supra note 15, at vii; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 1,
110-11; FINKELSTEn & VEGH, supra note 1, at 3, 59.
62 See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 43-44; YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra
note 3, at 110; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 12-14.
63 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 3.
6 See id. at 3; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 43-44; YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC,
supra note 3, at 110.
' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 3.
6 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives
and Debts, art. 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/14 (1983), reprinted in United Nations
Conference on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts:
Vienna, Mar. 1-Apr. 8, 1983: 2 Official Records: Summary Records of the Plenary
Meetings and of the Committee of the Whole, at 148, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/16
(1995) [hereinafter Vienna Convention on Succession of States].
62 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 24.
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debts contracted by the parent state would have a legal claim against the
seceding state for money owed.' The Vienna Convention obligates the
seceding state to assume debts related to assets transferred to the seceding
state and requires that the debt be divided in equitable proportion to the
assets transferred. 69
B. Assets
The Vienna Convention states that all fixed assets located in the
seceding state belong to the seceding state, all financial assets pertaining
to or located in the territory of the seceding state belong to the seceding
state, and all other financial assets pass to the seceding state in an
equitable proportion. 0 The Vienna Convention requires that state ar-
chives which are normally located in, or are directly related to, the
territory of the seceding state belong to the seceding state.71 Furthermore,
either state may have the right to receive copies of the other state's ar-
chives which are related to one's own archives, cultural heritage, or
territory.72
IV. APPROACHES TO THE APPORTIONMENT OF DEBT AND ASSETS
A. Debt
Depending upon which of the four approaches is used to decide the
apportionment of debt, the amount of debt to be assumed by the seceding
state can vary widely. 3 For instance, if Quebec secedes from Canada,
Quebec's share of the debt could range from one-sixth to one-third of
Canada's public debt.74 Canada is among the world's most indebted
countries with a debt of roughly $547.9 billion,75 making the difference
6' See id. at 6-7.
69 See id. at 17, 21.
" Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 66, art. 15; see also
Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 5, 13.
7' Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 66, art. 15.
7 Id.
' See Chant, supra note 12, at 86 ("Quebec's share ranges from $68 billion (21
percent of the debt) under a modified B6langer-Campeau approach to the $110 billion
(30 percent) under the assumption that the debt should be divided according to
historical benefits from Confederation.").
74 See McCallum, supra note 15, at viii; see also YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEc,
supra note 3, at 216 (estimating the range as between 18.50% and 32.03%).
7s See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 117; C6TE & JOHNSTON, supra note
10, at 15, 90-91.
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between the possible amounts of debt to be assumed by Quebec reaches
$90 billion.76 Recognizing that there is no absolute rule in international
law favoring one of the four apportionment approaches,' this Essay
examines all four. the per capita approach, the gross domestic product ap-
proach, the historical benefits approach, and the historical tax shares ap-
proach. The method, advantages, and disadvantages of each approach are
illustrated through the employment of each approach in determining
Quebec's share of Canada's public debt if Quebec secedes from Canada.
1. Per Capita Approach
Under the per capita approach, the public debt is divided on a per
capita basis, meaning that the percentage of the debt to be paid by the
seceding state is in direct proportion to the seceding state's population.
Since Quebec's population is 25% of Canada's population, Quebec would
be obligated to pay 25% of Canada's debt." The reasoning behind the
per capita approach is that each person should assume an equal share of
the public debt.' Canada's public debt was accumulated by all Canadi-
ans, and the funds were spent by the Canadian government to benefit the
entire country.8 Therefore, if Quebec decides to secede from Canada,
then Quebec should take its fair share of Canada's debt in equal propor-
tion. 2
The rationale supporting the per capita approach and the simplicity
of the calculations required are the major benefits of this approach.
Canada's public debt is divided by the total population of Canada, then
multiplied by Quebec's population to determine Quebec's share of the
76 ($547.9 billion x 1/3)-($547.9 billion x 1/6) = $91.3 billion.
'7 See C6TA & JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 100.
78 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; FREEMAN & GRADY,
supra 6, at 118.
79 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; Boothe et al., supra
note 10, at 51; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 46, 117 (calculating 24.9% as
the exact figure); COTE & JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 9; McCallum, supra note 15,
at viii (calculating 25.4% as the exact figure); Daniel Drolet, The Quebec Referendum;
The Facts Behind the Question; Contention, Controversy Awaits the Beginning of the
Debate, OTTAWA CrriZEN, Dec. 10, 1994, at B3.
'o Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 454.
, See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216.
See id.
See Stringer, supra note 10, at 68; Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 77-78;
YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note
6, at 118.
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public debt."* For example, Canada's debt of $547.9 billion is divided by
its population of 29.2 million people, multiplied by Quebec's population
of 7.2 million, resulting in Quebec's share of the debt at $135.1 bil-
lion.' This calculation is based on the simple concept of equity.' The
per capita approach is straight-forward and easily understood, and thus the
average citizen is likely to accept this basis for apportioning the public
debtY
The only debatable issue is deciding when to take the measurement
of Quebec's and Canada's population.' Once Quebec announces that it
will secede from Canada but before Quebec officially secedes, a large
volume of migration activity between Quebec and the rest of Canada will
occur.89 It is predicted that more people will leave than enter Quebec,
hence there will be an inverse relationship between Quebec's share of the
public debt and the amount of time that elapses before the population
measurement is taken.'
If the apportionment of debt is based on the population of Quebec
and Canada at the time secession is decided, subsequent large population
migrations from Quebec would drastically alter Quebec's debt to person
ratio,9 ' thus preventing the attainment of the most equitable apportion-
ment of debt at the time secession occurs.' In this case, when Quebec
officially secedes from Canada and receives its share of the public debt,
Quebec would assume a larger percentage of the debt than its current
population would dictate. Because Quebec would decide whether to
secede by a vote of all Quebec citizens, it would seem appropriate to use
the date of the vote for measuring the population because this is the day
that the Quebec citizens choose to leave Canada and assume responsibility
for their portion of the debt. Also, it is not pragmatic to base the appor-
tionment of debt on the population of Quebec and Canada at the time
secession officially occurs because the delay prevents a quick resolution
See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118.
($547.9 billion [Canada's debt]! 29.2 million people [Canada's total population])
x (7.2 million people [Quebec's total population]) = $135.1 billion [Quebec's total share
of the debt]. See id. at 46, 53, 117.
See id. at 118; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 454-55.
See Stringer, supra note 10, at 68; Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 77-78.
" See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 55; YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra
note 3, at 216.
89 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216 (stating that people
will emigrate from Quebec if they still wish to be citizens of Canada and vice-versa).
o See id.
9, Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 55.
9 See id. at 33.
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of the apportionment of debt.93 An approach which provides a quick and
equitable apportionment of public debt is necessary for providing a
smooth secession.94
2. Gross Domestic Product Approach
Under the gross domestic product approach, the seceding state's
percentage of the value of all goods and services produced by the parent
state's economy is used to determine the seceding state's share of the
public debt.95 Specifically, Quebec's share of Canada's Gross Domestic
Product is Quebec's share of Canada's debt.' Quebec contributes 22.6%
of Canada's Gross Domestic Product, therefore, Quebec would be obligat-
ed to pay 22.6% of Canada's debt.' The gross domestic product ap-
proach is based on the theory that the amount of debt assumed by the
seceding state should be directly related to the seceding state's income."
Therefore, the seceding state's share of the debt is based on the seceding
state's ability to pay the debt." Accounting for the ability to pay ensures
that the seceding state will not receive an unmanageable debt burden."°
Quebec's regional prosperity determines Quebec's ability to pay. 1'
Hence, the Gross Domestic Product is calculated by averaging Quebec's
Gross Provincial Product, the figure used in determining regional prosperi-
ty, over eight years. 2 The Gross Provincial Product does not include
taxes. Quebec produced less federal tax revenues from its goods and
services than it received in federal funds through revenue sharing."'
Thus, it is contested that Quebec should not continue to receive this
benefit by only having to assume the percentage of the debt proportional
9 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216.
94 See id. at 100. Cf. BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 118 (arguing a set of guidelines
for resolving problems will make secession easier).
9' See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 33; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
118-19; YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216.
96 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216.
' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 47, 118-19; but see McCallum, supra
note 15, at viii (showing Quebec's portion of the GDP as 23.2%).
9' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118.
99 See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216.
, See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 54.
101 See id. at 33.
See id. at 33, 43 (using the years 1981 through 1989; the years between the two
recent economic peaks).
'03 See id. at 34.
,"4 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 119.
276 [Vol. 29:263
APPORTIONING PUBLIC DEBT AND ASSETS
to Quebec's revenues, since Quebec received more in federal benefits."
While the gross domestic product approach protects a seceding state from
being forced to assume an unrealistic debt by basing the apportionment
of debt on the seceding state's ability to pay, this approach ignores how
much revenue has already been contributed toward paying off the
debt."6
3. Historical Benefits Approach
The historical benefits approach apportions the public debt by
allocating debt shares based on past benefits received."° The seceding
state's share of the parent state's debt is based on the net benefits
received by the seceding state while a part of the parent state.1°8 The
more the seceding state benefits, the greater its share of the public
debt."° The reasoning behind this approach is that the seceding state
should pay for the benefits it received for being a part of the parent
state."' The proportion of debt apportioned to the seceding state corre-
sponds to the amount of federal money spent in the seceding state."'
The net benefit received by the seceding state is determined from all past
federal spending to the seceding state and from all past federal withdraw-
als from the seceding state."2 The excess of federal expenditures over
federal revenues for the seceding state is the net benefit received from the
parent state."3
Under the historical benefits approach, Canada's public debt is
divided according to Quebec's share of net fiscal benefits starting from
1961."1 The year 1961 was chosen as a starting point for calculating
Quebec's net benefits because that was the first year Canada started
compiling provincial economic account statistics, and in 1961 Canada's
,o5 See id.
'o See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 54; see YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, su-
pra note 3, at 216.
" See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 30; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455;
YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216.
" See Stringer, supra note 10, at 57; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 22
(discussing the relevance of "historical benefits" of assets when dividing debt).
t0 See Stringer, supra note 10, at 57.
1o See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 34; McCallum, supra note 15, at ix.
.. See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 119.
..2 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 34; Stringer, supra note 10, at 57.
"' See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 34; Stringer, supra note 10, at 57.
'4 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 43; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
119.
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public debt was only $20.1 billion."5 These statistics are adjusted to
take into account the effect of a number of factors including regulated
prices for natural resources to calculate correctly the proportion of
debt. 6 Under this approach, Quebec would have to pay approximately
32% of Canada's debt because an excess of 32% of Canada's federal
funds were spent in Quebec."' Quebec has received more funds from
Canada's federal government than it has paid, thus, if Quebec separates,
Quebec must pay Canada back for the excess funds."' The apportion-
ment of debt will be regarded as a final settling of accounts by requiring
Quebec to reimburse Canada's federal government for all those years
when Quebec received more money from the federal government than it
paid to the government through taxes." 9
The methodology for calculating the apportionment of debt under the
historical benefits approach is flawedY° Equating the excess of federal
expenditures over federal revenues for the seceding state with the se-
ceding state's net benefit might not prove to be an accurate representation
of the benefits received by the seceding state while a part of the parent
state.' This method leaves out a few costs and benefits necessary for
calculating the net benefit of the seceding state.' Some items which
benefit the entire parent state are only analyzed for their benefit to the
seceding state." Another factor not accounted for is the migration of
people from the seceding state to the parent state and vice-versa."z For
instance, many individuals could have received benefits through federal
spending in one state, then moved to another state while the original state
upon secession would assume the burden of those federal expenditures
even though these individuals are no longer a part of its citizenry."
" See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 119.
126 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 43-44; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6,
at 119.
"' See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 43, 53, tbl.6; YOUNG, SECESSION OF
QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216 (using the provincial economic accounts from 1961 to
1988); McCallum, supra note 15, at viii. Employing the provincial economic accounts
from 1961 to 1992, Quebec's share of Canada's debt is 35.9%. See FREEMAN &
GRADY, supra note 6, at 117 tbl.2.
..8 See McCallum, supra note 15, at ix.
119 See FREEMAN & GRADY, ,upra note 6, at 119.
22 See Stringer, supra note 10, at 57, 61-62.
122 See id.
22 See id. at 57.
' See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455 (using defense as an example).
224 See Stringer, supra note 10, at 62.
225 See id.
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Migration may frustrate any attempt to divide the debt according to
benefits received."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately calculate the seceding
state's net benefit by adjusting the provincial economic account statistics
on federal spending and revenues to allow for regulatory policies such as
agriculture price stabilization programs, import quotas, auto pacts, and
energy policy."z The historical benefits approach favors seceding states
which benefitted from regulatory policies and hurts seceding states which
have received fiscal benefits." Seceding states must repay fiscal bene-
fits but not benefits gained through regulatory policies. 29
Another problem with the historical benefits approach is determining
what period of analysis should be used for calculating the apportionment
of the public debt.' For determining Quebec's share of net fiscal bene-
fits, the period of analysis employed was the period of time for which
statistics were available.' It is impossible to know precisely Quebec's
fair share of Canada's public debt because Canada already had a public
debt when statistics started being kept for federal expenditures and
revenues in Quebec. For instance, Quebec's share of Canada's debt is
32% or $128.3 billion using the statistics from 1961 to 1988,32 but
Quebec's share of Canada's debt is calculated as being 35.9% or $196.7
billion using statistics from 1961 to 1992.13 $68.4 billion is a sizable
disparity which fully illustrates the impact of the particular period of
analysis employed on the calculation of the apportionment of debt. The
error in estimating Quebec's share of the public debt would not be as
great as the above example illustrates because Canada's public debt was
only $20.1 billion in 1961, the year Canada started keeping statistics. 3 1
Nevertheless, the possibility of such an error exists. If there are times
when an absence of statistics prevents a proper determination of the net
benefit received by the seceding state for being a part of the parent state,
then this method of debt apportionment should not be employed. 3
12 See id.
"' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 22; Stringer, supra note 10, at 57.
' See Stringer, supra note 10, at 58.
"9 See id.
11 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 22; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18,
at 455.
" See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 119.
1 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 43, 53, tbl.6 (calculated by adding the total
amount of debt and pensions).
"' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 117, tbl.2.
'3 See id. at 119.
" See Stringer, supra note 10, at 58.
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4. Historical Tax Shares Approach
The historical tax shares approach, also referred to as the Blanger-
Campeau approach, determines the seceding state's share of the public
debt in proportion to assets transferred to the seceding state." This ap-
proach bases debt apportionment on how much the seceding state benefit-
ted from the accumulation of the parent state's public debt.'37 This
benefit is defined as the difference between past provisions of federal
government goods, services, and transfers to the seceding state and the
seceding state's past contributions to federal tax revenues.
3 1
The rationale for the historical tax shares approach is that the
seceding state "must assume full responsibility for obligations of the
federal government to its own citizens,"'1 39 and the seceding state's debt
cannot be calculated independently of the asset side of the balance
sheet." Hence, this method utilizes a balance-sheet approach by match-
ing federal assets with liabilities.' 4' All federal assets are evaluated and
each asset is allocated to a portion of the debt incurred. 2 As a result,
a link is formed between the assets and debt, requiring the payment of
the debt to be the same percentage as the amount of the assets re-
ceived. 43 The seceding state should assume a dollar of debt for every
dollar of assets that the seceding state takes." If the amount of assets
apportioned to the seceding state is greater or less than the amount of
debt apportioned to the seceding state, the amount of debt actually
assumed by the seceding state is raised or lowered to equalize the seced-
ing state's share of the public debt and assets.
In determining the apportionment of Quebec's share of Canada's
public debt, the historical tax shares approach considers the past relation-
ship of Quebec's future tax liabilities for servicing the public debt,
" See Pesando, supra note 21, at 489; McCallum, supra note 15, at viii; Desjardins
& Gendron, supra note 1, at 21; Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 28; Boothe & Harris,
supra note 18, at 454-55; Chant, supra note 12, at 86; Stringer, supra note 10, at 56;
YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC supra note 3, at 216.
137 See Stringer, supra note 10, at 62.
138 See Pesando, supra note 21, at 490.
139 See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455.
"4 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 31.
141 See Peter Hadekel, Campeau's Loose Lips Could Sink PQ's Sovereignty Ship,
GAzmr, Feb. 8, 1995, at D6.
142 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC supra note 3, at 216.
143 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 119.
'" See Stringer, supra note 10, at 65.
143 See McCallum, supra note 15, at xvi.
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Quebec's future pension obligations, and Quebec's acquired assets.'4
Quebec's share of Canada's debt is based on the concept that Canada's
current debt "is the present value of the excess of future tax revenues
over future government [expenditures]."'47 Quebec's share of the public
debt should be the share of future federal revenues that would be raised
from Quebec.'" Since future revenues cannot be known in the present,
past contributions to federal revenues are used in determining Quebec's
share of the debt. 49 The ratio of Quebec's past federal tax contributions
to Canada's total federal taxes is utilized for estimating Quebec's future
taxes. 50 By adopting the principle that Quebec's share of past obliga-
tions are based on Quebec's historical tax share,"' Quebec's share of
future tax liabilities is calculated by averaging its past shares of federal
revenues."' Using the years 1972 to 1988 as the applicable time period,
Quebec's average share of federal revenues is 22.8%.'
The historical tax shares approach to dividing pension liabilities
assumes all federal employees working in Quebec would transfer to
Quebec's government and all federal employees working in the rest of
Canada would continue to work for Canada.' 4 Quebec would assume
pension responsibilities for all federal employees working in Quebec."
Quebec's share of pension liabilities would be proportional to the number
of federal employees who work in Quebec, while Canada's share of
pension liabilities would be the remaining portion of federal employees
who work in the rest of Canada and all former federal employees.'56
Quebec's share of the pension liabilities is 13.3%."s This percentage is
calculated from the superannuation accounts of the federal govern-
ment.5 . By calculating Quebec's future tax liabilities, future pension
obligations, and acquired assets, Quebec's share of Canada's debt is
16.6% under the historical tax shares approach.' 9
'4 See Chant, supra note 12, at 86; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455.
'4 McCallum, supra note 15, at xvii n.2.
'43 See id. at xvii-xviii.
'49 See id. at xviii.
" See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455.
151 See id.
,s2 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 116.
,' See McCallum, supra note 15, at xviii; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
116 (analyzing the 1972-1988 time period for determining the average federal revenue).
"u See McCallum, supra note 15, at xviii; Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 32.
155 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 23.
See McCallum, supra note 15, at xviii; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
116.
'r See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 116.
' See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 39, tbl.2, 42.
,s' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 116; McCallum, supra note 15, at viii.
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The historical tax shares approach is criticized for compensating for
a surplus or deficit in the seceding state's share of assets by adjusting the
seceding state's share of the parent state's debt." A seceding state with
an asset deficiency would receive an immediate benefit through a reduc-
tion of its share of the parent state's debt, but a seceding state with a
surplus of assets which might not be liquidated for years would still be
obligated to assume its full share of the debt immediately.16 1 Another
argument against calculating debt apportionment of the seceding state
based on the seceding state's share of assets is that the parent state's
federal government did not incur the public debt simply to purchase
assets but grew from successive years of deficit spending." The ap-
proach of distinguishing between the debt incurred to finance the acquisi-
tion of assets and the debt incurred to finance current expenditures is re-
jected as unnecessary because the data on which the decision to issue
debt formally rests treat all expenditures as current expenditures." Also,
basing the division of debt on future tax liabilities is problematic because
this approach utilizes past tax liabilities for determining debt apportion-
ment.Y Since past tax liabilities can be markedly different from future
tax liabilities, the calculations can be skewed."
The justification for applying a special calculation for the division of
pension liabilities is rejected in favor of apportioning pension liability in
exactly the same way as all other liabilities.' The historical tax shares
approach of apportioning pension liabilities by dividing unfunded liability
of superannuation accounts according to the residence of the federal
employees is questionable because usually there is no correlation between
the employees' place of residence and the beneficiaries of the employees'
This calculation of the seceding state's share of public debt is derived by the formula:
"D = aL-(a-b)A-mL," where D = seceding state's share of the public debt; L = value
of parent state's public debt; A = value of parent state's public assets; a = seceding
state's share of net federal liabilities; b = proportion of federal assets acquired by the
seceding state; and m - proportion of federal liabilities held in monetary form by the
seceding state. Fortin, supra note 19, at 340-41. See also discussion infra part IV.B
(apportioning assets).
"6 See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 81; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at
456.
161 See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 81.
,62 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 115.
' See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 82.
'6 See id. at 77.
6 See id.
' See id. at 82; Stringer, supra note 10, at 67; Pesando, supra note 21, at 491;
McCallum, supra note 15, at ix.
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services delivered. 67 "[E]xisting pensions have been earned by public
servants providing services to all Canadians, including Quebecers, and
should be shared on the same basis as any other federal government
debt."' Under this modified version of the historical tax shares ap-
proach, Quebec's share of Canada's debt is 18.5%."
B. Assets
Two of the same approaches that could be employed in the appor-
tionment of debt may also be utilized in the apportionment of assets
between the seceding state and the parent state. They are the historical
tax shares approach, which apportions assets through historical shares of
federal tax revenues, 7' and the per capita approach of dividing assets
based on the proportional population size of each state."' The interna-
tional concept of territorial sovereignty which involves state possession of
public assets physically located within its territory may also be employed
for the apportionment of assets."r
The gross domestic product approach and the historical benefits
approach are not used for asset apportionment; instead both approaches
rely on the per capita approach for asset apportionment."w The gross
domestic product approach is not appropriate for asset apportionment
because it would penalize poorer seceding states by apportioning an
insufficient amount of assets to function as an independent state. 4 The
historical benefits approach is rejected for asset apportionment because se-
ceding states that had net contributions to the federal government would
not receive any assets under this approach.7
Determining a fair apportionment of public assets and the liabilities
associated with these assets requires the appraisal of all public assets and
liabilities.76 Depending upon which approach is used for valuing public
t67 See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 82.
'6 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 116.
' See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 40, tbl.3; Fortin, supra note 19, at 341 n.1.;
YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; Hadekel, supra note 141;
Drolet, supra note 79 ("Some sovereignists have mentioned a percentage as low as 18
per cent.").
"'1 See Pesando, supra note 21, at 490.
,71 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219.
'7 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 121; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 11;
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 43-44; FINKELSTEIN & VEGH, supra note 1, at 58-59.
'" See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 43-44.
7 See id. at 43.
75 See id. at 44.
176 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 114.
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assets, the determination of each asset's value can vary widely."7 The
historical tax shares approach combines the valuation of assets with the
apportionment of assets by netting various assets and liabilities against
each other."' Under the per capita approach, the appraisal of the current
value of all public assets and liabilities is completed before the apportion-
ment of assets is commenced." Under the location approach of ter-
ritorial sovereignty, no valuation of assets occurs because assets are
divided based on their physical location."0
Along with the determination of the material worth of some assets,
the diversity of public assets also complicates the establishment of a fair
and equitable standard for the valuation and distribution of assets.'
There are two major types of public assets: financial assets and fixed
assets." There are also some assets which require special treatment
such as federally owned companies, and in Quebec's case the St. Law-
rence Seaway.8  The apportionment and valuation of each type of asset
is analyzed separately.
1. Financial Assets
Financial assets are movables which include gold and foreign curren-
cy; receivables, especially from taxes owed; loans, held by federal lending
agencies; and liquid holdings, such as cash, transportation equipment,
works of art, artifacts, books, and furniture.' The valuation of financial
assets is easily detemined through the resale value of these marketable
assets. " As a result, under the per capita approach, apportioning most
financial assets before or after liquidation is not problematic." Howev-
er, loans present a problem for the per capita approach because they are
affixed to specific corporations or residents."8
The location approach apportions assets based on their physical
location,' thus, loans could be apportioned by the location of the cor-
," See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 70.
'78 See id. at 69.
m See id.
110 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 121.
".' See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219.
" See id.
"8 See id. at 220-21.
" ' See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 76; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC,
supra note 3, at 219.
" See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 73, 76.
6 See id. at 78.
7 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219.
188 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 110.
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poration or the person receiving the loan. 89 Under the location ap-
proach, if assets are physically located outside both the seceding state and
the parent state, these assets are apportioned to the state which subsidizes
these assets."9° Originally, for the apportionment of assets, the historical
tax shares approach allowed the seceding state to acquire all of the
financial assets which the seceding state found attractive, but due to the
subjectiveness implicit in this method of apportionment, a modified
version was established.19 Under the modified historical tax shares
approach, financial assets are apportioned according to the seceding state's
average historical tax contribution."9
2. Fixed Assets
Fixed assets are immovables which include federally owned build-
ings, airports, shipping ports and the surrounding land, small-craft harbors,
bridges, highways, railways, national parks, and specialized equipment."9
Estimating fixed assets is problematic, and there is no consensus on how
to value these assets.'94 Fixed assets could be evaluated on the basis of
current market values, replacement costs, or historical costs.95 An ac-
ceptable method for determining the value of fixed assets is necessary.
For valuation purposes, it is desirable to evaluate fixed assets in
groups distinguished by their expected economic return." Income pro-
ducing assets should be appraised in the same manner as marketable
financial assets,"9 which entails establishing the current market value or
the resale value of the assets."9 These assets include airports, housing,
commercial buildings, some bridges, agricultural property, and museums
and other federally owned buildings.'9 The market value of assets, such
as highways and some bridges, that have quantifiable expenses but
'" See id. at 111.
'9 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 123 (explaining that money and power dictate
which parties take control of assets located outside the territory of the parent and the
seceding state).
... See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 41; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 457.
"n See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 41-42; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at
457, 457 n.2.
,"' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 12; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note
6, at 110; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219.
194 See generally Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 32.
195 See id.
" See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 74.
'97 See id. at 76.
' See id. at 73, 76; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 114.
' See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 76.
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unquantifiable economic benefits cannot be properly estimated.' Since
these assets generate an economic benefit but carry financial obligations,
they should be given a market value of zero.2" Likewise, assets which
do not provide an economic benefit but require little or no maintenance,
for example, some historical sites, monuments, bridges, recreational
canals, and marine facilities, should be valued at zero.'
After valuing the fixed assets, the location approach apportions these
assets to the state in which these assets are situated. 3 It is difficult, if
not impossible, for fixed assets located in one state to be controlled by
the other state.' It is unlikely that the apportionment of fixed assets
based on the assets' location would equal the share calculated under the
per capita approach. 5 Thus, some balance must be achieved to establish
an equitable apportionment of all assets combined. For instance, if there
is a verifiable disparity between the fixed assets apportioned to the two
states, the amount of that disparity may be corrected by altering the
apportionment of financial assets until the disparity in fixed assets appor-
tioned is counterbalanced by the apportionment of financial assets.
The historical tax shares approach also apportions fixed assets on the
basis of the assets' location.' This approach estimates the value of
fixed assets and determines each state's share of assets according to the
property tax payments made by the federal government, or to federal
grants received in lieu of taxes.' Fixed assets are valued on the basis
of replacement costs,' but this approach makes rough modifications to
the acquired data derived for different purposes." This approach ne-
20 See id. at 75-76.
20 See id. at 75.
z See id. at 74-75.
See id. at 79; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note at 6, at 110.
See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 74.
20 See id. at 79.
2 See id. at 80.
' See McCallum, supra note 115, at xvii; Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 31.
Under the historical tax shares approach, assets acquired by location are incorporated
into a general plan to obtain an equitable apportionment of debt and assets. See discus-
sion supra part IV.A.4.
' See McCallum, supra note 15, at xvii; Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 32;
Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455.
M See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 38.
20 See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 74 (noting that such rough calculations
provide a flawed basis for valuing Canada's assets). For instance, in calculating
Quebec's apportionment of assets, the replacement values of the fixed assets are
obtained from estimates by the Canadian federal government's Task Force on Program
Review: Report on Real Property. See McCallum, supra note 15, at xv. Since this
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glects some assets not represented in this "grants-in-lieu calculation," for
example, bridges, highways, airport runways, monuments, small craft har-
bors, dams, national parks, and specialized equipment. " '
3. Federally Owned Companies
Federally owned companies could be treated like fixed assets or
financial assets because they hold both movable and immovable as-
sets.2"2 Whether the company should be treated as a fixed asset or a
financial asset for the purpose of asset apportionment will depend on the
particular company.2  The location approach is employed for the appor-
tionment of federal companies treated as fixed assets.21 All companies
whose assets are located completely within one state belong to that
state.2 5 Under the Quebec/Canada scenario, examples of these types of
companies are the Montreal and Quebec Port Corporations.2 6
Some companies owning assets in both the seceding state and the
parent state are treated as fixed assets, and apportioned according to the
location approach,217 while other companies are viewed as financial
assets and apportioned by the per capita or historical tax shares approach.
In Canada most p.ublic companies including the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation, the National Capital Commission, Petro-Canada, and Bell
Canada, due to the immovability of many of their assets, are treated as
fixed assets, and their assets are split between Quebec and the rest of
Canada based on the assets' location.2 8 All of the companies' assets
situated in Quebec would pass to Quebec, while assets situated in the rest
of Canada would belong to Canada.2 Other companies such as Air
report was designed only as a resource for making changes in the management of
Canada's real property, approximations are given in this report when there was not
enough available information for the proper estimation of the assets' replacement value.
See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 74.
21 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 32 n.6.
222 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 15.
223 See id. (noting the importance of the relation a particular company has with the
remainder of Canada in apportioning its assets). Cf. YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC,
supra note 3, at 220 (distinguishing characteristics of crown corporations).
224 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 15.
215 See id.
226 See id.; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 111.
227 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 15; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF
QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 220; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 111.
226 See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 15; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note
6, at 111.
219 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219-20; Desjardins &
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Canada, Canadian National Railway, Canadian Pacific Railway, and
Canada Post Corporation which have common infrastructural services, and
hence cannot be fragmented, are apportioned as financial assets.' The
apportionment of each of these company's assets is determined by the
distribution of the ownership shares of each company to achieve equality
among assets without harming the production of the company."2 These
shares in the capital of each company can be distributed on a per capita
basis or in proportion to the value of the assets situated in each state. '
Originally, the historical tax shares approach allowed the seceding state to
choose whichever companies the seceding state found attractive, but due
to the subjectiveness implicit in this method of apportionment a modified
version was established.' Under the modified historical tax shares ap-
proach, federally owned companies are apportioned according to the
seceding state's average historical tax contribution."
4. St. Lawrence Seaway
In the Quebec/Canada secession scenario, due to the St. Lawrence
Seaway's ownership and management situation, the Seaway's apportion-
ment would not be conducted by one of the typical apportionment
approaches.' Currently under international law, Quebec has jurisdiction
over the river bed and banks located in Quebec, while Canada controls
the water and "maintains a fleet of icebreakers to ensure year-round
shipping" for the Seaway.' Under the St. Lawrence Seaway Agreement
of 1951, management of the St. Lawrence Seaway is done by a bi-
national commission composed of Canadians and Americans.'
Gendron, supra note 1, at 15; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 111.
See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219-20; Desjardins &
Gendron, supra note 1, at 15 (suggesting fragmentation as a possible approach for
dividing common assets).
2' See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 220.
2 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 220; Desjardins &
Gendron, supra note 1, at 15.
2 See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 41; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 456,
457.
", See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 41 n.14; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18,
at 457.
2 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 110-11 (suggesting the
necessity to operate the seaway on a full cost recovery basis).
See David Israelson, Deep Routes Transportation Links Knit Quebec into the
Fabric of Canada. What Would Happen to Them and the Shipment of Goods, Given
New Borders and Changed Jurisdictions?, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 22, 1995, at D1.
' See id.
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The St. Lawrence Seaway Agreement is categorized as a dispositive
or localized treaty which under customary international law is one of the
few kinds of treaties that would require Quebec's compliance after its
secession from Canada." Quebec would be required to assume all
treaty rights and obligations regarding the maintenance and navigation of
the Seaway under the Seaway Agreement. 9 Quebec must grant naviga-
tional rights to the United States and the rest of Canada, and participate
in the regulation of the Seaway and tolls.'
V. PAST SECESSIONS
A. Belgium's Secession from the Netherlands
Belgium's independence from the Netherlands was announced in
1831 at the London Conference, an international conference held for the
express purpose of ensuring that war did not result from Belgium's
secession from the Netherlands." The London Conference was com-
prised of representatives from the five major European powers: Great
Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, the Netherlands, and Bel-
gium. 2 This Conference was the first to propose a fairly specific meth-
od for the settlement of debts arising out of secession. 3 First, Belgium
and the Netherlands would pay their own debts which they brought into
the unification of Belgium and the Netherlands in 1814.' Since Bel-
228 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 111. Under customary
international law, rights and obligations of treaties usually do not automatically transfer
to the seceding states because "it is a basic principle of treaty-law that treaties bind
State parties only." WnIlIAMS, supra note 2, at 33-34. Dispositive or localized treaties
are exceptions to this rule because these treaties provide stability and "impress a
permanent and indefeasible status" on the territory. Id.
229 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 84; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 38.
See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 84; W.LIAMS, supra note 2, at 38-39;
YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 111.
"2 See Baron De Gruben, The Dutch Regime f1814-18301 and the Kingdom of
Belgium (1830-1840), in BELGIUM 25, 34-35 (Jan-Albert Goris, ed., 1945); HELMREiCH,
supra note 5, at 29.
,22 See Draft Articles on Succession of States in Respect of State Properly, Archives
and Debts Adopted by the International Law Commission at Its Thirty-Third Session,
33rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.117/4 (1983), reprinted in UNITED NATIONS CONFER-
ENCE ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT OF STATE PROPERTY, ARCHIVES AND
DEBTS: VIENNA, MAR. 1-APR. 8, 1983: 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS: SUMMARY RECORDS OF
Tim PLENARY MEETINGS AND OF THE COMMrIrEm OF TE WHoLE 88, 88 n.493
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Succession of States]; see generally HELMREICH, supra
note 5, at 15.
3 See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 88.
See id. at 89; HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 26.
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gium merged its debts with the Netherlands' debts when Belgium and the
Netherlands united, it was considered most equitable after Belgium's
secession to redivide these debts in the same proportion in which the
debts were originally joined.23 Second, Belgium would assume re-
sponsibility for a fair proportion of the debt commonly contracted during
the union of Belgium and the Netherlands.1 6 Calculations for determin-
ing this fair apportionment of debt were based on debt figures from
Dutch financial charts. 7
At the onset, debt was apportioned in proportion to the average share
of taxes paid by each country from 1827-1829." Using this historical
tax shares approach of debt apportionment, Belgium was apportioned
16/31 of the existing debt. 9 This apportionment method was rejected
because it created an unequal division of debt' for the purpose of en-
ticing the Netherlands to sign the peace treaty granting Belgium indepen-
dence.24 During negotiations, Belgium offered to reduce debt payments
in return for territorial concessions or vice-versa.24 For example, Bel-
gium was willing to release any claim over a portion of Limburg in
return for a decrease in debt obligations or to increase its debt obligations
in return for acquiring the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.243 The appor-
tionment of debt was not settled until 1839.' During the nine years
after Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, but before an agreement on
debt apportionment was made, Belgium did not and was not obligated to
contribute any amount to the payment of the Netherlands' debt. In the
end, the Belgians received a large reduction in the amount of debt they
had to pay because they were forced to surrender the Grand Duchy of
, See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 89.
See id.; HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 26.
See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 89; HELMREICH,
supra note 5, at 54.
' See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 89 (quoting article
X of the Twelfth Protocol of the London Conference).
'9 See id. (quoting article XI of the Twelfth Protocol of the London Conference as
holding Belgium liable for 16/31 of the debt); HELMREIcH, supra note 5, at 17; LON
VAN DER ESSEN, A SHORT HISTORY OF BELGrum 156 (1920).
240 See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 89 (noting that
France in particular objected to this apportionment); HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 18.
241 See HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 54.
242 See id. at 53-54; Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 89.
24 See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 89; HELMREICH,
supra note 5, at 51-52.
244 See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 231, at 90; HELMREICH,
supra note 5, at 58.
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Luxembourg and some of their northern territories which bordered the
Netherlands, specifically Flemish Zeeland and parts of Limburg.245
Along with determining the debt Belgium owed to the Netherlands,
the London Conference also decided matters involving the apportionment
of assets.2 For instance, it was agreed that all public or private utili-
ties, such as canals or roads, located in Belgium, but built at the
Netherlands' expense, would belong to Belgium.247 Additionally, Bel-
gium was granted free use of the Scheldt River and other internal water-
ways which went through the Netherlands.2 Many of these decisions
made by the London Conference were retained as an acceptable means of
apportionment by the 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts Issues.
B. Norway's Secession from Sweden
In June of 1905, Norway's government voted to leave the union of
Sweden and Norway and declared independence.249 Two months later
the people of Norway overwhelmingly approved by vote the declaration
of Norway's independence from Sweden." By fall of that year, Norway
had officially seceded from Sweden."' Norway's secession from Sweden
was unique in that military forces were not utilized by either side during
any point of the secession. Sweden was shocked by Norway's declaration
of independence,' 2 and was sure that it could achieve a military victory
243 See VAN DaR ESSEN, supra note 239, at 156-58 (discussing the apportionment
of debt and surrender of territories); HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 28-29, 58.
246 See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 28.
247 See id.
243 See HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 29, 58.
249 See RAYMOND E. LINDGREN, NORWAY-SWEDEN: UNION, DISUNION, AND SCANDI-
NAVIAN INTEGRATION 131 (1959); T. K. DERRY, A HISTORY OF MODERN NORWAY
1814-1972, 163 (1973); KAREN LARSEN, A HISTORY OF NORWAY 490 (1948); G.
GATHORNE HARDY, NORWAY 119 (1925); Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions
Happen?, supra note 9, at 780.
' See LNDOREN, supra note 249, at 166-67; DERRY, supra note 249, at 166;
LARSEN, supra note 249, at 491; HARDY, supra note 248, at 120; FREEMAN & GRADY,
supra note 6, at 62; Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, supra note 9, at
783.
"' See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 90-91; LINDGREN,
supra note 249, at 198; DERRY, supra note 249, at 171; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra
note 6, at 60.
2 See LINDGREN, supra note 249, at 132; Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions
Happen?, supra note 9, at 781.
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over Norway to force Norway to stay in the Union. 3 Nevertheless,
Sweden did not want to resort creating a dictatorship over NorwayY4
In fact, Sweden expressed to Norway its intention of not sending any
forces into Norway unless Norway attacked Sweden first. 5 Since Nor-
way also believed that a physical conflict between Norway and Sweden
would be detrimental to both countries, 6 Norway's secession was set-
tled diplomatically. 7
The Karlstad Conference was held to negotiate the final settlement
of Norway's secession from Sweden."8 Both Sweden and Norway
agreed to pay off their own debts and to apportion the common debt held
between the two states. 9 Financial and fixed assets located outside
Norway and Sweden were appraised or sold and then apportioned on an
equal basis.' Financial assets, such as archives which only concerned
Norwegian affairs, were apportioned to Norway without prior apprais-
al."' All other assets were apportioned based on their location. 2 Nor-
way and Sweden granted each other equal rights for utilizing transit fa-
cilities such as railroads, 3 and equal access to lakes and rivers for
transportation purposes.' Sweden and Norway also stipulated that any
future disputes between Sweden and Norway would be arbitrated before
the Hague Court.'
See LINDGREN, supra note 249, at 133.
z See id. at 132-36; Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, supra note 9,
at 781.
'5 See generally LINDGREN, supra note 249, at 115; DERRY, supra note 249, at 164.
See LINDu REN, supra note 249, at 128; DERRY, supra note 249, at 165.
s See Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, supra note 9, at 781.
See LNDGOREN, supra note 249, at 172; DERRY, supra note 249, at 166-69;
LARSEN, supra note 249, at 492; Young, How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, supra
note 9, at 784.
5 See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 90-91.
See id. at 29 (stating that these assets were apportioned on a equal basis).
See generally id. (stating that the predecessor state should receive property the
successor state would otherwise abandon).
See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 61.
See LuqDGREN, supra note 249, at 146; DERRY, supra note 249, at 169; Young,
How Do Peaceful Secessions Happen?, supra note 9, at 786.
See LINDREN, supra note 249, at 146; DERRY, supra note 249, at 169.
See DERRY, supra note 249, at 169.
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C. Slovakia's Secession from the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic
The Czech and Slovak separation of 1993 was the most recent,
peaceful secession.6 This Slovakian secession was authorized by a
federal act of the Czech and Slovak Federal Government after Slovakia
threatened to secede.67 At the onset of negotiations concerning
Slovakia's secession, Czechs emphasized that military force would not be
used to prevent the secession a Negotiations between the Czech and the
Slovak party leaders dissolved the Czech and Slovak Federal Government
within four months.6 The per capita approach was used for the appor-
tionment of the public debt.' The per capita approach was also em-
ployed for the apportionment of financial assets, while fixed assets were
distributed by the location approach?7' Some federally owned companies
were apportioned by their location, while others like the broadcasting
service were transformed into joint-stock companies with shared owner-
ship.' All assets located outside of either Slovakia or the Czech Re-
public were apportioned on a per capita basis.7
VI. THE APPORTIONMENT OF PUBLIC DEBT AND AssErs IF QUEBEC
SECEDES FROM CANADA
The per capita approach should be utilized in the apportionment of
debt and of most financial assets if Quebec secedes from Canadafv4
Fixed assets and other financial assets, specifically loans, should be
apportioned by the location approach.s The determination of whether
federally owned companies should be apportioned like fixed assets, by the
26 See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7 (describing the
peaceful secession that occurred at midnight on December 31, 1992).
' See Paul Wells, A Unilateral Declaration of Independence, OTrAWA CrrIZEN, Oct.
21, 1995, at D6; YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 27-28;
YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 156-157.
= See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 32 n.28.
See id. at 41; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 156-57;
FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 65-67.
m See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 47; YOUNG,
SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
67, 112.
27 See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 47; FREEMAN
& GRADY, supra note 6, at 67.
m See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 28, 42.
27 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 111-12.
See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 77, 82; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note
6, at 120, 123; Stringer, supra note 10, at 68.
" See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 44-45.
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location approach, or like financial assets, by the per capita approach,
depends upon the characteristics of the specific companyY6 Companies
should be divided by the location approach, unless this division would
substantially harm the production of the company.'m In that case, the
ownership shares of those companies should be apportioned on a per
capita basis. 8
International law requires that Quebec continue to grant the rest of
Canada free access along the entire St. Lawrence Seaway.' This re-
quirement copies the condition placed on the Netherlands by the other
members of the London Convention that Belgium could continue its use
of the Scheldt River and other important, internal waterways located
within the Netherlands,' and resembles Norway and Sweden's agree-
ment of equal access to each other's lakes and rivers for transportation
purposes." All other assets located outside both Quebec and the rest of
Canada should be apportioned using the per capita approach.' Prece-
dent for the employment of these debt and asset apportionment approach-
es was established when Slovakia seceded from the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic. Fixed assets were apportioned by location, while debt,
financial assets, and all other assets located outside the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic were apportioned on a per capita basis. 3
The per capita approach illustrates the philosophy that if secession
occurs, Canada's finances "are a collective responsibility to be shared
equally by all current citizens." Therefore, under the per capita ap-
proach, the population of Quebec and Canada on the day Quebec voted
to secede from Canada should be the figure used in determining Quebec's
share of the public debt and assets. The per capita approach is founded
on the basic notion of equity that each person should be obligated for
26 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219-20.
27 See id.; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 15.
See YOUNG, SECESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219-20. A possible solution
is the creation of a third category for the apportionment of federally owned companies,
whereby the apportionment of the ownership shares of some companies would be
calculated in proportion to the value of the companies' assets located in each state. See
Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 15.
' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 84; WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 38-39;
YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 111.
See HELMREICH, supra note 5, at 29, 58.
8' See LINDGREN, supra note 249, at 146; DERRY, supra note 249, at 169.
2 See BOOKMAN, supra note 7, at 119.
See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 43, 47;
FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 67, 111-12.
' See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 454.
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and apportioned an equal share. This concept provides a strong argu-
ment for the implementation of the per capita approach in debt and asset
apportionment that would be accepted by the average person. The
simplicity of the calculations required for the apportionment of the public
debt and assets provides another reason for supporting the use of the per
capita approach.'
The difficulty in apportioning some assets to any state other than the
state where the assets are located provides the only disruption in employ-
ing the per capita approach.'s Utilizing the location approach in these
circumstances is justified because the territorial sovereignty principle of
apportioning fixed assets by their location and financial assets by their
connection with activity in a specific location is a firmly embedded
principle of customary international law. 9 Both loans and federally
owned companies can qualify as financial assets linked to the territory
because the borrower's residence and the companies' services are location
specific.2' However, the location approach fails to consider the value of
the fixed assets, loans, and companies being divided, assets divided by
the location approach may be apportioned unequally.29' Consequently,
the apportionment of all other financial assets should be adjusted to
counterbalance any disproportionate apportionment of assets.292
The gross domestic product approach, the historical benefits ap-
proach, and the historical tax shares approach provide a less equitable
apportionment of debt and assets than the per capita approach. In fact, the
gross domestic approach and historical benefits approach both defer to the
per capita approach for the apportionment of assets.2 The gross domes-
tic product approach is less effective in apportioning the public debt
because its analysis does not consider benefits received by Quebec in
federal funds, and the data used in calculating Quebec's Gross Domestic
's See id. at 454-55; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118.
6 See Stringer, supra note 10, at 68; Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 77-78;
YOUNG, SUCCESsION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216 ("The per capita formula has
the great advantage of being simple enough to be understood by the public . . .
FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118.
28 See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118; Stringer, supra note 10, at 68.
22 See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 74, 79.
See FINKEL5T'IN & VEGH, supra note 1, at 58-59; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at
43; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 12-13.
2 See YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 219; FREEMAN & GRADY,
supra note 6, at 111, 232; Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 13.
29 See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 79.
See id. at 80.
See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 43-44; Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at
458.
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Product do not include taxes.294 Conceptual problems with the historical
benefits approach include leaving out important benefits such as regu-
latory policies in calculating debt apportionment, and not establishing a
standard concerning how many years back the calculations should be
carried for determining debt apportionment. 5
Due to flaws in its methodology, the historical tax shares approach
is also not feasible for debt and asset apportionment. First, past tax
liabilities do not necessarily provide a reliable guide for determining
future tax liabilities, which is the goal of this approach.2' Second, the
method of valuing fixed assets according to federal grants in lieu of
property taxes provides unreliable approximations of the assets' value.'
Third, Quebec would be able to chose which federally owned companies
it wanted, and then adjust its debt obligations to correspond with its se-
lected assets regardless of the rest of Canada's position."8 Fourth, divid-
ing pension liabilities for federal employees by their residence is less
effective than dividing the pension liabilities in the same manner as all
other public debt.'l In fact, if pension liabilities were treated like all
other liabilities under the historical tax shares approach, Quebec's appor-
tionment of debt would more resemble Quebec's share of the public debt
as calculated under the per capita approach.3" This fact may serve as an
additional reason why the per capita approach should be employed for the
apportionment of public debt and assets during state secession.'
VII. CONCLUSION
International law does not require the seceding state to assume any
portion of the parent state's public debt.' On the other hand, ever
since Belgium seceded from the Netherlands, it has been accepted that the
public debt should be divided between the seceding state and the parent
state in an equitable proportion.' A standard approach for public debt
'" See Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 34; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
119.
2 See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 455; Stringer, supra note 10, at 57-59.
See Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 77.
2 See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 456; Boothe et al., supra note 10, at 32.
See Boothe & Harris, supra note 18, at 456.
2" See Pesando, supra note 21, at 491; Ip & Robinson, supra note 15, at 82;
Stringer, supra note 10, at 67.
' See Stringer, supra note 10, at 68.
3'' See id.
' See Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 6; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note
6, at 53; WILLIAMs, supra note 2, at 46-47; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra
note 3, at 110.
"o See Draft Articles on Succession of States, supra note 232, at 88-89; FREEMAN
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apportionment during state secessions should be adopted. The per capita
basis should be the standard approach used for equally apportioning the
debt between a seceding state and the parent state. The per capita ap-
proach uses a very manageable type of calculation based on easily retriev-
able and objective figures.' Verification of this approach's utility is
provided by Slovakia's secession from the Czech and Slovak Federal
Republic, where the per capita approach was employed to apportion the
debt between Slovakia and the Czech RepublicJ 5
Territorial sovereignty which is an accepted principle of customary
international law allows for the location of public assets to dictate the
apportionment of these assets.' Thus, the standard utilization of the
location approach for the apportionment of fixed assets or financial assets
linked to a specific area is substantiated by current, customary internation-
al law. All financial assets not tied to a specific area should be equal-
ly apportioned between the seceding state and the parent state.' The
per capita approach should be the standard approach employed for
apportioning these financial assets. As with debt apportionment, the per
capita approach provides the most equitable and simplest means for
apportioning financial assets.' The utilization of the per capita ap-
proach and the location approach as the standard methods of asset
apportionment has been legitimized by Slovakia's secession from the
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, where financial assets and fixed
assets were apportioned by the per capita approach and the location
approach respectively.I
& GRADY, supra note 6, at 112; Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra
note 66; see generally Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 21 (discussing equitable
division).
' See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118; YOUNG, SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC,
supra note 3, at 216.
30 See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, supra note 7, at 47; YOUNG,
SUCCESSION OF QUEBEC, supra note 3, at 216; FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at
112.
306 See FINKSTEIN & VEGH, supra note 1, at 58; WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 43;
Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 11-17.
' See FRONESTEIN & VEGH, supra note 1, at 58; WnLLAMs, supra note 2, at 43;
Desjardins & Gendron, supra note 1, at 11, 13.
o See Vienna Convention on Succession of States, supra note 66.
See FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 118; Stringer, supra note 10, at 68.
310 See YOUNG, THE BREAKUP OF CzECHOSLovAKIA, supra note 7, at 43, 47;
FREEMAN & GRADY, supra note 6, at 67.
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As a result of the implementation of the per capita approach and the
location approach as the standard approaches for the equitable apportion-
ment of public debt and assets during state secession, the quick resolution
of these difficult apportionment issues would expedite a smoother and
more amiable secession.
